Election Quality Monitorfrom Colorado and Beyond by Harvie BranscombMenuSkip to contentHomeElection Watching in Colorado – resource page2016 WatchingOpen Records (CORA) Requests2016 CORA Archive2015 CORA ArchiveOther LinksRisk-Limiting Audit Representative Group (2017)Input for Pilot Election Review Committee (2015)Election Watcher Advisory Panel (2015)Uniform Voting Public Participation Panel (2013-2014)AffiliationSearch for:Suggestions for improvement of Colorado electionsJune 2, 2019BlogCCCA, CO Legislature, CO SOS, COlegHarvieSuggestions for improvement of Colorado elections by Harvie Branscomb 6/1/2019  harvie [at] electionquality.com  6/2/2019  http://electionquality.comIn Coloradoseveral conditions have changed in the last twenty years that meritconsideration and accommodation in election methods through substantiveimprovements – 1) the precinct polling place has been eliminated, thusseparating the citizen voter from ability to observe the election process, and2) the voter is no longer present when his/her eligibility is determined and 3)the ballots are no longer sorted by precinct and this has impinged on ballotanonymity. Finally, 4) voting systems now provide the possibility for interestedcitizens to access copies of the election records through images and cast voterecords. The age of the evidence-basedpublic election has begun and Colorado is leading the way.On the way toa publicly verifiable evidence-based tabulation we are well into implementingthe Risk Limiting Audit. This audit oncecompletely implemented and supported by public access to election records will likelyend concern about election outcomes that are wrong for reasons involvingtabulation. This will have been a remarkable achievement. We are not quitethere yet. At present our Secretary of State is choosing what to audit, ourstatewide contests aren’t fully auditable, our cast vote records are beingsummed by software for the audit but the cast vote records are not available tobe checked. And our ballots, images and cast vote records are not entirelyanonymous, even though the Colorado constitution requires this.Mysuggestions below are motivated by the desire to credibly achieve theevidence-based public election that enables a public audit of election outcomes:Toachieve substantive ballot anonymityPay closerattention to the necessary clear separation between the identifiable-voter eligibility phase and the anonymous-ballot tabulation phase – this is a general guiding principle.Particular attention must be paid to the places where these phases overlap, ifat all. For example, the deconstruction of envelopes containing two ballotsfrom U voters in primaries where the voter did not affiliate or state apreference is an overlap situation that requires attention. Counties haveinvented several different methods to maintain a verifiable separation of theidentity from the anonymity phase.End theidentifiability of approved/tabulated provisional ballot sheetsby making them identical in form